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Abstract 
Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation 
and incentive for users. Consequently, users can obtain services without them-
selves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads 
to the "free-riding" and "tragedy of the commons" problems, in which the 
majority of information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P 
nodes willing to share their resources. The objective of this thesis is to enable 
service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each 
node has provided to its community, thereby encouraging all network nodes to 
share resources. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism at all in-
formation sharing nodes. The mechanism is driven by a distributed algorithm 
which has linear time complexity and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allo-
cation. Besides giving incentive, the mechanism distributes resources in a way 
that increases the aggregate utility of the whole network. Second, we model 
the whole resource request and distribution process as a competition game be-
tween the competing nodes. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium 
and is collusion-proof. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which 
all competing nodes interact with the information providing node to reach the 
Nash equilibrium in a dynamic and efficient manner. Experimental results 
are reported to illustrate that the protocol achieves its service differentiation 
objective and can induce productive information sharing by rational network 
i 
nodes. Finally, we show that our protocol can properly adapt to different node 
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In the past few years, there have been tremendous interests on P2P networks. 
As witnessed by the traffic measurement of ISPs, a large percentage of traffic 
is clue to P2P applications[2]. The emergence of P2P computing ensures users 
a new information exchange paradigm on the Internet, and this new paradigm 
has the potential to provide high information accessibility to large number of 
users. 
Unlike the traditional client-server computing paradigm, P2P networks al-
low individual user (or node) to play the role of a server and a client at the 
same time. Therefore, nodes in a, P2P network can help each other in file 
searching[l], file lookup[17, 18, 21, 23] as well as file transfer in an anonymous 
manner[6]. For the file searching process, the P2P networks evolve from a cen-
tralized file/directory lookup approach (e.g., Napster) to a distributed objects 
query approach (e.g., Gnutella). Since the distributed object query is a form of 
controlled flooding, new generation of P2P networks (e.g., Chord, CAN...etc) 
use the method of consistent hashing function to provide efficient file lookup 
service. 
Although there has been significant progress in improving the performance 
of file searching/lookup in P2P networks, there exist some fundamental and 
challenging issues that remain unanswered. The free-riding and the tragedy of 
1 
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the commons are two of such problems. In [3], authors reported that nearly 
70% of P2P users do not share any file in a P2P community and these users 
simply free-ride on other users who share information. Since there are few 
users who are willing to share information or to provide file transfer services, 
nearly 50% of all file search responses come from the top 1% of information 
sharing nodes. Therefore, nodes that share information and resources are 
prone to congestion, which leads to the tragedy of the commons problem [9:. 
Ill summary, the current P2P network does not provide service differentiation, 
so there is no incentive for users to share information or to provide file transfer 
services. 
Currently, there are some oversimplifed mechanisms that have been imple-
mented in P2P softwares in order to encourage people to share information. 
For example, Kazaa [11], considers the "participation level" of each peer. The 
"participation level" is calculated by the ratio between a peer's recent up-
loads and downlaods. But this ratio is not accumulated over time, and only 
provides differentiation for Query requests. Another P2P system, eMule [10], 
established a credit system where the credits are exchanged between any two 
specific peers. During the competition of downloads, the information providing 
node reduces the qiieiieing delay for the peers which previously provide much 
uploads to that information providing node. Both of these mechanisms do not 
provide any analytical or concrete solution for why such kind of mechanisms 
can work and why fairness can be maintained among all the peers. 
In this thesis, we propose a protocol to provide service differentiation based 
on the contribution level of individual node. Roughly speaking, a node which 
shares popular files and provides more service (via file upload) to the P2P 
community will have a higher contribution level. In return, when this node 
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asks for a file transfer service, it will receive higher utility than other com-
peting nodes which have lower contribution levels. The incentive protocol we 
propose focuses on the file transfer process because the amount of data trans-
fer per unit time is much higher than that of the object lookup/query. We 
address the importance of incorporating incentive-compatible resource distri-
bution mechanism in a P2P protocol. The goals of the resource distribution 
mechanism are (i) to provide service differentiation, (ii) to encourage nodes 
to share information or services, (iii) to maximize the social welfare[19] or the 
aggregated utility of individual users. It is important to point out that our 
incentive protocol can be adopted by various P2P systems which use either 
the distributed query (e.g., Gnutella) or the consistent hashing approach (e.g., 
Chord or CAN). 
Our incentive-compatible resource distribution mechanism has the follow-
ing features: 
1. Fairness: nodes which have contributed more to the P2P network should 
gain more resources or higher utility. 
2. Avoidance of resource wastage: the mechanism will not assign more 
resource to a node than it can consume. In case when the communication 
path is congested, the mechanism can adapt to the congestion level and 
distribute the appropriate amount of resource. 
3. Adaptability and Scalability: the mechanism can adapt to conditions 
like network congestion and dynamic node joining or leaving. Since the 
mechanism is installed at each node, it is scalable as the size of the P2P 
network increases. 
4. Maximization of social utility: Under certain circumstances, our 
mechanism not only maximizes the individual utilization, but achieves 
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high aggregated utility for users as well. 
As we will show, the proposed mechanism makes different requesting users to 
bid for resource and thereby creating a dynamic competitive game. In order to 
assure every nodes in the P2P network will follow the mechanism honestly, the 
dynamic game created should be strategic-proof and collusion-proof. The first 
property implies that following the proposed mechanism is the best strategy 
for each user in a P2P network. The second property implies that users cannot 
gain extra resource by cooperatively deceiving the system. 
In here, we briefly present some related work. In [8], the authors address 
one possible mechanism for centralized P2P systems like Napster. This the-
sis, on the other hand, can be applied to both centralized or distributed P2P 
networks. Zhong et al. [24] discuss shortcomings of micro-payment and repu-
tation system. They propose a cheat-proof, credit-based mechanism for mobile 
ad-hoc networks. However, they did not address how to provide incentive and 
service differentiation. In [7], the authors discuss the economic behavior of 
P2P storage networks only. In [22], the authors model P2P networks as a 
Cournot Oligopoly game and give an elegant control-theoretical solution fo-
cusing on global storage system only. This thesis, on the other hand, focuses . 
on the file-transfer and bandwidth allocation of a P2P system and we use the 
mechanism design approach in designing a competitive game in a P2P system. 
In [13], the authors proposed a budget-balance virtual money exchange mech-
anism to bring incentive into P2P networks. This thesis, in the same context 
of the problem, uses a game-theoretic approach, and provies a stronger solu-
tion concept which is incentive-compatible. Lastly, algorithmic mechanism 
design [15, 16, 20] provides a theoretical framework for designing incentive 
mechanisms. 
The balance of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give 
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a general overview of how the information providing nodes interact with the 
information seeking nodes. In Chapter 3, we present our resource distribution 
mechanism and its properties. In Chapter 4, we present our dynamic game 
model and show how it can be applied to a P2P network. In Chapter 5, we ex-
tend this thesis to a more generic setting, and show some more general results. 
In Chapter 6, we present experimental results that illustrate the performance 
and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and competition game. Chapter 
7 concludes. 
Chapter 2 
Incentive P2P System Overview 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of our incentive P2P system. In par-
ticular, we illustrate the interactions between different nodes during the file 
transfer process. In later chapters, we will formally present the development 
of the resource distribution mechanism and its performance properties. 
Similar to other P2P systems, each node in our incentive P2P network can 
play the roles of both a server and a client at the same time. During a file trans-
fer, the node which provides the service (e.g., uploading files to other nodes) 
is called the source node, denoted as Ns. Nodes which request file download 
from Ms are called the competing nodes, and are denoted as . . . , A/W, 
where N is the number of competing nodes. Each node in our incentive P2P 
network has a contribution value, which indicates how much service the node 
has provided to the whole P2P community. In order to maintain these values 
securely, there is an entity called the auditing authority, denoted as A. One 
should view the auditing authority as a distributed infrastructure. For the 
implementation issues of A , please refer to [12 . 
Figure 2.1 illustrates a scenario where there are two competing nodes 
and M , which request file download service from the source node Ms. The 
source node has an upload bandwidth resource of W^ (in bits/s). From time 
to time, these competing nodes send messages hi[t) and 62(0 (in bits/s) to 
6 
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Figure 2.1: Illustrating two competing nodes and a source node. 
Ms, telling how much transfer bandwidth they desire. Upon receiving these 
messages, Ms will use a resource distribution mechanism (to be presented in 
Chapter 3) to distribute its bandwidth resource VK based on the values of 
6i(力)’ 62(0, as well as the requesting nodes' contribution values denoted by 
Ci(t) and respectively. As a result, Ms sends the file data to Mi and 
M2 with bandwidth xi {t ) and 0 :2� ,respect ive ly . However, it is possible that 
there is network congestion along the communication path between J\fs to Mi 
(or A/^ 2). Therefore, packets may be lost and the actual received bandwidth at 
node Ni and M2 are r r ; � < Xx{i) and < 0 :2� ,respect ive ly . 
The auditing authority A in an incentive P2P network is a distributed 
database which serves two important functions. First, the auditing authority 
乂 will reply with the contribution value of any node upon request. For exam-
ple, the source node Ms needs to know the contribution values of its competing 
nodes so as to distribute its resources accordingly. Second, the auditing author-
ity A maintains or increments the contribution value of a node, say M , when 
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Ms presents the evidence that it has performed some service for other nodes. 
As mentioned before, a source node will receive messages (e.g., hi) from the 
competing nodes and these can be used as evidence for contribution update. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the two functions of A. Again, for the implementation 
of A , as well as related issues on security and collusion, please refer to [12 . 
• ( ‘ 
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of functionalities of auditing authority: (a) reply con-
tribution value upon request; (b) update contribution value upon request. 
The message hi[t) plays two important roles. First, it can be regarded 
as a bandwidth bidding message from the perspective of the competing node 
J\f-, Another usage of bi(t) is that it is a confirmation to the source node 
A/； that Ni has received a certain amount of service (measured in unit of 
bits/s). This kind of message helps the source node to determine the proper 
bandwidth assignment. If a competing node is inactive or failed, the source 
node will assume that the competing node cannot receive any data. Therefore, 
it will not send any more packet to the competing node. The source node, on 
the other hand, can adjust the bandwidth resource assignment whenever it 
receives a bidding message. The justifications for this adjustment are: (1) a 
newly arriving competing node may request Ms for a new file download, (2) 
an existing competing node finishes its file transfer service, and (3) due to 
network congestion situation, a competing node replies with different values 
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of bidding messages throughout the file download session. To efficiently utilize 
the bandwidth resource W^ and to improve the rate of contribution increase 
for A/'s, the source node needs to adjust the bandwidth distribution among 
competing nodes. 
I execution of resource distribution mechanism at source node A^ ^ 
» sending bidding/receipt signal 
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Figure 2.3: Interaction between competing nodes and a source node. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the interactions between the competing nodes and 
the source node Ms- At time to, the competing node Afi requests the transfer 
of a large file Fi and sends a bidding message bi(to) to Afs- After verifying 
the identity and contribution level of Mi, Ms uses the resource distribution 
mechanism to determine the sending bandwidth a::(力。)，and delivers some data 
packets of Fi to Afi based on this rate allocation. After receiving these data 
packets, Ni sends another bidding/receipt hi[ti) at time ti. Ms then determines 
the new resource allocation and sends some additional data packets of file Fi 
based on Note that at this round of the data delivery, some data packets 
are lost due to network congestion. Therefore, Mi sends a bidding/receipt bi[t2) 
to Ms at time with 6‘(之2) < The source node Ms adjusts the resource 
allocation and delivers additional data packets of file Fi to Ni at a lower rate. 
At time “，a new competing node A/'^ - requests a transfer of the file Fj from Ms 
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and sends its bidding message Ms adjusts the resource allocation based 




In this chapter, we discuss how the source node, say Ms, uses the mechanism 
to distribute its bandwidth resource W^ (in bits/s) among all its competing 
nodes M， . . � J ^ n ' For ease of presentation, we start with some simple mech-
anisms and will discuss their shortcomings. Then we introduce some more 
sophisticated features so as to provide service differentiation and incentive. 
Even sharing mechanism (ESM): The first mechanism is to evenly divide 
the resource W^ among all competing nodes. When there are N competing 
nodes requesting file download, Ms transmits a file to a competing node M\ 
with an assigned bandwidth xf. 
Xi = I forz•二 1 , . . . , 见 (3.1) 
Although this mechanism seems fair in distributing the resource, there are some 
inherent problems. First, the bandwidth resource wastage may be significant. 
The wastage can occur in at least two forms: (1) if the connection between 
J\f, and a competing node is congested, the assigned bandwidth is not fully 
utilized, and (2) the physical download bandwidth of a competing node may be 
less than the assigned bandwidth of W /^A^； hence, the source node K cannot 
11 
Chapter 3 Resource Distribution Mechanism 12 
deliver information at that rate. Note that resource wastage also implies that 
Ms contributes some service to the community. However, the amount of work 
may not be counted towards its contribution. Another problem of this type of 
mechanism is that it provides no service differentiation among the competing 
nodes. Therefore, rational users have no incentive to share their information 
or service, resulting in the tragedy of the commons. 
Resource bidding mechanism ( R B M ) : The aim of this mechanism is to 
overcome the resource wastage problem mentioned above. Under this mecha-
nism, every competing node is required to send a bidding message periodically 
to Ms. Let hi{t) be the bidding message from the competing node M] at time t 
indicating the maximum bandwidth (in bits/s) that Mi can absorb at time t. 
Given all the bidding messages from the competing nodes, Ms has knowledge 
of the upper bound bandwidth assignment and will not assign any bandwidth 
higher than bi{t) to Afi at time t. Notice that it seems possible for some com-
peting nodes to request more bandwidth than they really need; we will discuss 
the rational bidding values of the competing nodes in Chapter 4. 
One important property of the RBM mechanism is that it provides max-
min fairness [4, 5]. Suppose x = [x ' l , . . . , xn] is the bandwidth allocation for 
all N competing nodes within the feasible domain Xi G [0,6,] for i = 1 , N . 
Then a feasible allocation is max-min fair if and only if an increase of Xi within 
its domain of feasible allocation must be at the cost of a decrease of some x j , 
where Xj < Xi. Physically, the max-min allocation gives each competing node 
its maximum demand or evenly share the bandwidth with other competing 
nodes when they are not fully satisfied. From [5], one can show that there 
exists a unique max-min fair allocation vector x, and it can be obtained by a 
•progressive filling algorithm. The algorithm initializes all Xi — 0. It will then 
increase all competing nodes' bandwidth resource at the same rate, until one 
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or several competing nodes hit their limits (i.e., Xi = hi). When that happens, 
the resource allocation for these competing nodes will not be increased any 
more. The algorithm will continue to increase the resource of other competing 
nodes at the same rate. The algorithm terminates when all competing nodes 
hit their limits, or the total resource Ws is fully utilized. Mathematically, we 
can express the max-min resource distribution as follows. Let A/j, be N 
competing nodes sorted based on the non-decreasing value of hi. The resource 
distribution of the RBM mechanism is 
. / , L 1 /V 
XT = mm < 6f, -� > /c = l’...，yv. {6.1} 
^ [‘‘ N-k-\-l ) 
—> 
Figure 3.1(a) illustrates the RBM with four competing nodes of 6 = [1,2.5,2.5,4 
(in Mb / s ) and the resource bandwidth W^ = 7 Mb/s . The resource allocation 
isx = [1,2,2,2) (in Mb/s ) , which is depicted by the shaded region in the figure. 
Although the RBM avoids resource wastage, it does not provide any in-
centive for nodes to share information. Two competing nodes with the same 
value of biddings will obtain the same amount of resource regardless of their 
actual contribution to the P2P community. 
Resource bidding mechanism with incentive ( R B M - I ) : To provide in-
centive, this mechanism takes the contribution level of competing nodes into 
account. Let Ci be the contribution value^ of the competing nodes M , and 
this value reflects the amount of work that Mi has performed (for example, 
sharing and uploading files for other nodes). The contribution value Ci can be 
retrieved from the auditing authority A at the beginning of the file transfer 
process, or every time when the source node receives the bidding message bi{t) 
from the competing node Afi. 
1 Detail discussions about how to update and maintain the integrity of contribution values 
of all nodes can be found in [12]. 
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Figure 3.1: Resource distribution mechanisms: (a) RBM; (b) RBM-I; (c) 
RBM-U; (d) RBM-IU. The shaded region represents the amount of resource 
allocation for individual nodes J 
One can implement the resource bidding mechanism with incentive (RBM-
I) by enhancing the progressive filling algorithm as follows. We distribute 
bandwidth resource to all the competing nodes at the same time but at differ-
ent rates. In particular, the competing node Mi will have a resource assignment 
rate of Ci. Also, once the assigned resource to Mi reaches its limit of bi, Afi 
will be taken out from the resource distribution. Therefore, one can view the 
mechanism as a weighted max-min resource distribution. Mathematically, we 
can express the RBM-I algorithm as follows. Let be N compet-
ing nodes sorted based on the non-decreasing value of bijCi. The resource 
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distribution is 
x-^  = mm b y N Q. ( 而 = 1 , ••.，". (3.3) 
� 乙 j 二k 3 ) 
Using the previous example in RBM but now with contributions C = 
2.5,1,2.5,4], the resource allocation is x = [1,0.8,2,3.2] (in unit of Mb/s ) , 
as shown in Figure3.1(b). One important property of this mechanism is that 
if two competing nodes have the same bandwidth bidding values and without 
hitting their limits, then the assigned bandwidth will be proportional to their 
contribution values ( i . e . ,爲 and A/3). 
Resource bidding mechanism with utility feature 
( R B M - U ) : The aim of this mechanism focuses on the efficiency of the resource 
allocation from the perspective of the competing nodes' satisfaction. Consider 
a case of two competing nodes Mi and Mj which have the same contribution 
values. If the bandwidth resource at the source node is W^ = 1 Mb / s and 
the two bidding messages are ⑴ 二 10 Mb/s and bj{t) = 1 Mb/s . Based on 
the R B M mechanism, they will receive a bandwidth resource of 0.5 M b / s each. 
Although the resource at Ms is efficiently utilized, the degrees of satisfaction of 
these two competing nodes are obviously different. To overcome this problem, 
we use the concept of utility [19] to represent the degree of satisfaction of a 
competing node given a certain allocated bandwidth. 
We first define the family of utility functions we consider in this thesis. 
Given an allocated bandwidth x, the utility of the node N\ is denoted by 
Ui{x). The utility function we consider in this work satisfies the following 
three assumptions: (a) Ui{x) is concave (or the marginal utility ^ ^ is non-
increasing V.T > 0), (b) C/i(0) = 0, and (c) the utility depends on the ratio of f . 
In other words, Ui(xi) = Uj(xj) whenever ff = ^ for any two competing nodes 
J\f- and Afj. The justifications for the above assumptions are as follows. First, 
Chapter 3 Resource Distribution Mechanism 16 
the utility function is concave, which is often used to represent elastic traffic 
such as file transfer [19]. Concavity implies that the marginal utility is non-
increasing as one increases the allocated bandwidth resource x. This captures 
the physical characteristics of elastic traffic: the utility increases significantly 
when a competing node starts receiving service. The increase of utility becomes 
less significant when the receiving bandwidth is nearly saturated. Second, the 
utility is zero when a competing node is not allocated any bandwidth. Third, 
because utility measures the satisfaction of a competing node, naturally, it 
is a function of the ratio of the allocated resource to the bidding resource. 
Furthermore, this assumption normalizes the utility of all nodes so that we 
can compare the degrees of satisfaction of different nodes. 
The objective of the RBM-U mechanism is to maximize the social (or ag-
gregate) utility. Formally, we have: 
N N 
max Ui(xi) s.t. ^ Xi < Ws and Xi G [0, bi] V i. 
i=l i=l 
It is important to point out that the implication of this maximization problem 
is to allocate resource to the competing node which currently has the largest 
marginal utility (i.e., largest dUi{x)/dx). The allocation process starts with 
Xi = 0 for i = 1,…，N, then assigns resource to the node which has the 
largest marginal utility and ends when the resource Ws is used up, or all the 
competing nodes are fully satisfied with Xi = hiMi. 
Let us consider the following form of utility function which satisfies the 
above three assumptions: 
/ X • \ 
Uiixi) = log ( + 1 where Xi G [0’ hi . 
\0i J 
The marginal utility is U[ = Therefore, the RBM-U mechanism tries 
to increase the resource to the competing node which has the smallest value 
of Xi + bi at any time. Using the previous example of RBM of 4 competing 
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nodes with b = [1,2.5,2.5,4] and Ws = 7 Mb/s , we use the above utility 
function and the resource allocation which maximizes the aggregate utility is 
X — [1,2.5,2.5,1] (in unit of Mb/s) . This result is depicted in Figure 3.1(c). 
The figure shows graphically how the mechanism works. Each competing node, 
say Afi, has a lower limit height which is equal to bi (i.e., the darkened region). 
The enhanced progressive filling algorithm distributes resource first to the 
competing node that has the lowest depth since that node has the largest 
marginal utility at that point. When the assigned resource to node Mi is equal 
to its maximum bidding bi, node N] is taken out from the resource distribution. 
The algorithm terminates when all nodes reach their maximum allocation, or 
when the resource Ws is fully utilized. 
Resource bidding mechanism with incentive and utility feature ( R B M -
l U ) : One can view the RBM-IU mechanism as a generalization of the previous 
discussed mechanisms. This mechanism considers both the utilities of compet-
ing nodes and their contribution values. Each competing node, say N], has its 
contribution value Ci and bidding message bi. Mathematically, the RBM-IU 
performs the following constrained optimization: 
N X N 
max V Ci log + 1 s.t. V Xi < Ws, G [0, bi] V i. 
The RBM-IU mechanism enhances the progressive filling algorithm as follows: 
(a) We treat the competing node Afi as a bucket with area bi and width Ci. 
(b) The bucket of the competing node Mi is located at a height of hijCi] 
therefore the upper limit of the bucket is at a height of IhijCi. (c) At any 
time, the RBM-IU mechanism increases the amount of resource put into the 
competing node's bucket which currently has the lowest height, i.e., the bucket 
that has the largest weighted marginal utility (weighted by the contribution 
value). It is interesting to observe that when the competing nodes have the 
same contribution value, the RBM-IU is equivalent to the RBM-U mechanism. 
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The spirit of this mechanism is to increase at a rate of Ci the amount of 
resource given to the competing node which has the largest weighted marginal 
utility of Cijihi + Xi). Figure 3.1(d) illustrates the RBM-IU mechanism with 
b = [1,2.5,2.5,4], C = [2.5,1,2.5,4] and W , = 7 Mb/s . The final resource 
allocation is x = [1,0,2.3,3.7] (in unit of Mb/s ) . From the figure, one can 
observe that the mechanism fills the bucket of hfi at most up to its area limit 
of hi at the resource distribution rate of Ci. The bucket of Mi at the "resource 
level" (n'i + 6 ‘ ) /Ci is guaranteed to have the marginal utility Cij{xi + hi). The 
algorithm terminates when all competing nodes reach their resource limit, or 
when the resource V\4 is fully utilized. 
The RBM-IU mechanism can be expressed by the following pseudo-code. 
The source node Ms maintains a sorted list of competing nodes with hi/Ci in 
ascending order. 
R B M - I U Mechanism () 
1. if (E^Ii hi < Ws) return 王 = 6 ; / * n o congestion*/ 
2. 1=2； U=l； /*upper and lower limits index*/ 
3. v=Ci； W=Ws； / • filling rate and resource capacity*/ 
4. level = ^；/*initialize resource level*/ 
5. while (w> 0) 
6. if ( ( m i n { — level)*v>w) 
7. level = level + w /v ; w=0; 
8. else if ( 势 <务） 
9. w - = (勢 - l e v e l ) * v ; level =奇；v —= Cu； u++； 
10. else 
11. w - = (羡 - l e v e l ) * v ; level =告；v += Ci； 1++; 
12. for (each i) 
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13. Xi = min{max{0, (level — 
14. return x] 
The above code performs the filling algoritlim when the total bidding is 
greater than the total available resource. In determining the final "resource 
level", we have three cases in the while loop at line 5: (1) When the resource 
is used up, the loop ends with the final resource level (lines 6-7) . (2) If the 
next available resource level is at the upper limit (or bidding level) of some 
competing node, we adjust the remaining amount of available resource and 
reduce the filling rate by that competing node's contribution value Ci since we 
will not give any more resource to the satisfied competing node (lines 8-9) . (3) 
If the next available resource level is a lower limit of some competing node, then 
we adjust the remaining amount of available resource and increase the filling 
rate by that competing node's contribution value Ci (line 11). The reason is 
that this competing node will have the largest weighted marginal utility for its 
turn to gain the resource at a rate of Ci. Note that this is a linear algorithm 
with a complexity of 0{N), where N is the number of competing nodes at 
the source node Afs. Therefore, the resource distribution can be performed 
efficiently. 
Lastly, the following two important theorems state some of the desirable 
properties of the RBM-IU mechanism. 
Theorem 3.1 For any two competing nodes Ni and A/}, the mechanism RBM-
UI assigns the bandwidth resources Xi and Xj such that: 
(3.4) 
bi Oj 
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Proof: When ^ > the stated condition is equivalent to: 
I <- % 
So initially, node Mi has a lower resource level than node Mj. Therefore, bucket 
i will hit its capacity faster than j. In the final bandwidth distribution, we 
have: 
^ ^ < (3.6) 
� i Cj 
When Eq. (3.6) meets the strictly less than condition, this implies that Xi = b � 
In this case, node M] is fully satisfied and reaches its maximal utility value of 
Ui{xi) = log 2 and therefore Ui{xi) > Uj(Xj). When Eq. (3.6) meets the 
equality condition, we divide Eq. (3.5) by ^ ^ ^ = ��, w h i c h gives: 
hj < bj > Xj + h i �X j + bj 
Xi + bi — Xj + bj hi 一 bj 
[xi + bA 
log ——"""> log — " " “ V J \ bj / 
Ui(xi) > Uj{xj) • 
Remarks: The implication of this theorem is that a competing node which 
has the highest contribution per unit resource request among all the clients 
will receive the highest utility. Therefore, the RBM-IU provides incentive to a 
P2P system and makes the balanced utilities among all competing nodes. 
Theorem 3.2 The resource allocation x is Pareto optimal, which implies that 
the resource allocation vector cannot be improved further without reducing the 
utility of at least one competing node. 
Proof: There are two cases for terminating the RBM-IU mechanism. One is 
when the aggregated bidding � < VV .^ In this case, and x = b and all 
nodes are equally satisfied. The second case is when the total resource W^ is 
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fully utilized. In this case, no matter how efficient is the other resource allo-
cation vector, it has to decrease some amount of resource of some competing 
nodes so as to improve the utility of other nodes. • 
Chapter 4 
Resource Competition Game 
In our P2P network, each competing node sends bidding messages to the source 
node. In return, the source node uses the mechanism RBM-IU for bandwidth 
resource distribution. The interaction between the competing nodes and the 
source node can be described by a game-theoretic framework [14]. We model 
the interaction of resource competition as a game and explore its solution and 
properties. (In this thesis, we focus on the competition game with one single 
source node only.) We also discuss how this game can be incorporated into 
our P2P protocol such that it converges to the Nash equilibrium. 
4.1 Theoretical Competition Game 
We model the resource bidding and distribution processes as a competition 
game between all the competing nodes. One basic postulate in game theory 
is that the game structure is common knowledge to all the players. In our 
game, we assume the total amount of bandwidth resource and all the 
contribution values Ci,s are common knowledge. This means that all nodes 
know the information, know that their rivals know the information, and know 
that their rivals know that they know the information, and so on. Also, we 
22 
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only consider the non-trivial situation when > Ws- The competition game 
can be described as follows: 
1. All the competing nodes are the players of the game. 
2. The bidding message bi is the strategy of the competing node J\fi. A 
bidding vector b = {6i, 62,..., bj^} is a strategy profile where N is the 
number of competing nodes in the game. 
3. The mechanism RBM-IU defines the rules and the structure of the game. 
—» 
We can regard mechanism R B M J U as a mapping function which has C 
and b as input parameters and returns x as output. 
4. The outcome of the game is the vector x which represents the amount 
of bandwidth resource each competing node obtains. 
—A • 
L e m m a 4.1 The mapping function RBM-IU: C x b x is quasi-concave in 
. e a c h individual's strategy bi. 
— — —A 
Proof: Consider any strategy profile b = {6“6_<} , where b_i is any fixed 
strategy profile (or bidding messages) of players other than Ni. We regard the 
resource allocation of Mi as a function of its bidding value, which is Xi(hi). The 
RBM-IU mechanism increases Xi only if xi < hi and the weighted marginal util-
ity Ci{xi + 一 1 is among the largest. Therefore, the function xiihi) increases 
when we increase hi from zero. The function Xi{hi) reaches its only peak when 
Xi = bi, or its marginal utility is less than that of some other competing 
nodes. The function value will decrease if we continue to increase bi. From the 
one-peak pattern of Xi{bi), we know the upper-level contour set is convex and 
therefore, the function is quasi-concave in bi. • 
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Theorem 4 .2 There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the competition 
game. 
Proof: The strategy set is convex and compact. The mechanism represents a 
continuous function for resource distribution and from Lemma 4.1, it's quasi-
concave in each bi. Therefore, by Proposition 8.D.3 in [14], the game has at 
least one Nash equilibrium. I 
L e m m a 4.3 For any player, say N], the strategy 6* = J 工 . i m p l i e s a re-
C� 
source allocation of x* = f o r i 二 1,…，TV. 
Proof: Let W be the least amount of resource which gives Mi the resource 
Xi = 二 而 . T h i s outcome will have the "resource level" of N] at height 
c � 
h ' = 甘 = " . Any other player, say A4, may report its strategy 61 in two 
possible cases: (1) When 6； < ，we have 2h'JCk < = h'. There-
fore, 4 = 6； < (2) When > we have h'JCk > 
Therefore, 4 = (h' - b'JCk)Ck < As a result, W = Ek=i 4 < 
Z^^Li = Ws- So with Ws amount of resources, we can at least dis-
tribute amount of resources to player Afi and this is also the bidding 
value bi. Therefore the RBM-IU mechanism will allocate exactly x* = 
amount of resources to player • 
Remark: The importance of the above lemma is in guaranteeing that a player 
can gain its fair share of resources during the competition. For some players 
who have small contribution values, they will not suffer from resource starva-
tion. For free riders, however, they will eventually gain zero resource in the 
competition. 
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Theorem 4 .4 The strategy profile h* = for player Ni, where i = 
1,…， /V, is a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: The aggregated bidding is = VV5, so that a;* = 6* for player Ni, 
for i = 1 , . . . , 见 From Lemma 4.3, any player Mk who insists on h% = 
gains Xk = b^  = • Therefore, regardless to the change of strategy from 
b*, player Ni gains xi < W , - T^ k^ Li 4 = • 
Theorem 4.5 The strategy profile b* 二 for player N], where i = 
1,…，yV, is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: By lemma 4.3, b* = induces x* = regardless of what 
the strategies the other players use. Since the RBM-IU mechanism won't as-
sign Xi larger than the bidding bi. Therefore the equilibrium strategy bi should 
A A A 
satisfy bi > b*. Suppose there exists some bi where bi = (1 + S)b* > b*. Let 
A 
US consider the strategy profile bk = (1 + \/ k ^ i. The initial "resource 
level” for the players other than i is b\/Ck == + + 
Similarly, the initial "resource level" for player i is which is 6/2h higher 
than that of all the other players. If {S/2h) Cj > Ws, player i gains Xi = 0. 
Otherwise, player i shares the left resource 二 Ws — {6/2h) Ylji^i Cj with 
all the other players and gains Xi = < x*. So Xi > x* can't be a Nash 
equilibrium strategy. • 
Definition 4 .6 X-collusion occurs when a subset of competing nodes Mx use 
strategy profile hi + 6* Vz G A/a, and achieve Yao^�而 > Ta&M� 
Theorem 4.7 Assuming that all honest competing nodes use the Nash equi-
librium strategy b* = Cj, the RBM-IU mechanism in the source 
node, avoids. A-collusion. 
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Proof: Suppose some players are not honest. But when honest players play 
their Nash equilibrium strategy h* = W s C " by Lemma 4.3 honest 
players are guaranteed to have a;* = h*. Therefore, the aggregated resource 
received by the dishonest players are Ws — Zlhonest <，which cannot exceed 
what they could have gained in the Nash equilibrium. I 
4.2 Practical Competition Game Protocol 
In the above section, we show that the interactions between the source node 
and all its competing nodes can be modeled as a competition game which 
has a Nash equilibrium solution. This solution assigns each competing node 
the amount of resource proportional to their contributions, efficiently utilizes 
all resource at the source node, and prevents collusion among the group of 
competing nodes. 
Although the theoretical competition game provides these attractive prop-
erties, there are gaps to fill in order to realize the theoretical game in an 
incentive P2P network. In particular’ one needs to address the following prob-
lems: 
• P I The information of contribution C and the amount of resource Ws 
is assumed to be common knowledge. How can this be implemented in 
a P2P system? 
• P 2 In real life, a competing node, say A/^ , has its maximum download 
capacity, say wi (in bits/s). Also, due to intermittent network congestion, 
the actual assigned bandwidth allocation Xi may be less than the actual 
received bandwidth x\. These two factors will affect the Nash equilibrium 
derived under the theoretical game. 
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• P3 In a dynamic environment like P2P networks, new competing nodes 
may arrive and ask for file download, while existing competing nodes 
may leave due to the termination of their requested transfers. Under 
these situations, how can the system maintain the equilibrium point in 
spite of changes in the number of competing nodes? 
To address these issues, let us first consider the behavior of the source node. 
Based on a certain strategy profile b and contribution values C, the source 
node carries out the RBM-IU algorithm for bandwidth resource distribution. 
The justification that the source node is willing to use this mechanism is that 
the allocation result is Pareto-optimal (based on Theorem 3.2). This implies 
that following the RBM-IU mechanism, the source node can maximize its 
contribution value and enjoy better service for future file download requests. 
However, without perfect information for all the competing nodes, the game 
solution may oscillate and cause resource wastage. For the source node to 
maximize its contribution, it has incentive to help all the competing nodes 
reach Nash equilibrium. In our practical game protocol, the source node will 
signal a competing node, say A/"“ with the value of Si = 'WsCij Cj when 
J\l\ initiates its request file download. This information exchange is inexpensive 
because: (1) the signal is sent only once for each competing node's arrival; (2) 
the signal value is computed on the fly and does not need global information 
about the contribution values of all the nodes in the network. Hence, issue PI 
is resolved. 
For the behavior of the competing nodes, let us see how the signals sent 
by the source node may help the game to reach its equilibrium. Suppose that 
a competing node, say M , has the maximum download capacity of Wi and a 
signal variable Si. Initially, si stores the signal value sent by the source node, 
i.e., Si = Si = WsCi ! Z ^ i Cj. The competing node Mi sends its initial bidding 
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message bi = min{i{;i, 5^} to the source node. After each round of data transfer, 
Aft measures x'-, the amount of bandwidth resource it receives from the source 
node, and stores it as the current signal value of Si, i.e., Si = x'-, To start the 
next round of data, transfer, Afi sends a new bidding message bi = min{wi ,Si ) 
to the source node. This bidding strategy assumes that the source node uses 
the RBM-IU mechanism, so that all competing nodes reach Nash equilibrium 
through feedback on their strategies. In the bidding message, competing nodes 
inform the source node of (1) its download bandwidth limit, and (2) whether 
there is any congestion along the data transfer path. 
The behavior of competing nodes as described above is an attempt to re-
solve the issues of P2 and P3. However, one can show that using this protocol, 
the system may not be able to reach Nash equilibrium. Consider the following 
illustrative example. Initially the source node Ms has resource W^ = 6 and 
it has one competing node Mi with lUi = 10 and Ci = I. The source node 
sends Afi a signal of = 6. Therefore, the initial bidding message from Afi 
is bi = mii i {10,6} = 6 and the resource allocation is n �= 6 (which is a Nash 
equilibrium point). Afterwards, a new competing node A/2 arrives with W2 = 1 
and = 1. The source node sends A/2 a signal of S2 = 3. Therefore, the 
initial bidding message from JV2 is 62 = min{ l , 3} = 1. The final resource 
allocation is 玄 = [ 5 , 1 ] (which is also a Nash equilibrium point). Now a new 
competing node A/3 arrives with W3 = 10 and C3 = 1. The source node sends 
A/3 a signal of S3 = 2. Therefore, the initial bidding message from A/3 is 
63 = min{10 ,2 } = 2. The final resource allocation is :r = [3,1,2]. Note that 
this equilibrium point is not a Nash equilibrium since there is some degree of 
unfairness between the two homogeneous nodes Afi and A/3, and A/3 could have 
received a higher bandwidth if it had increased its bidding. Another scenario 
in which the final resource allocation may not be a Nash equilibrium is when 
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some of the competing nodes experience network congestion such that x'- < xi. 
When these nodes, through feedback, use their new biddings bi = x\ for the 
resource allocation, some of the source node resources will not be utilized and 
will remain idle. This condition continues even if the network congestion dis-
appears later on for the competing nodes. In other words, the competing nodes 
cannot get back the amount of resource they could have obtained in the Nash 
equilibrium solution. To solve the problem, a competing node needs to behave 
more aggressively in order to obtain the proper amount of resource and help 
the system reach the new Nash equilibrium efficiently. 
To properly resolve issues P2 and P3, we propose the following extension 
protocol. Each competing node, say A/i, enhances its bidding by sending 
hi = min{if;i ,(l + S)si} (4.1) 
where is a small positive constant for all competing nodes. The purpose of 
reporting a slightly larger bidding value is to explore the possibility that there 
is some unused resource at the source node. The Nash equilibrium solution 
X* under the theoretical model is not changed except that the strategy profile 
is changed to be 6* = (1 + S)x*. In case there are idle resources and unfair 
allocations temporarily in the system, competing nodes which gain a smaller 
amount of resource can increase their biddings and push the system to the 
new Nash equilibrium point. Therefore, their subsequent bidding values will 
increase. Eventually, a new equilibrium is reached when each competing node 
bids bi = min{wi , (1 + (^)si} and receives = Si. 
From now on, we will assume that all competing nodes in the incentive 
P2P network send bidding messages according to Eq. (4.1). Obviously, all 
the competing nodes interacting with the source node will achieve a different 
allocation result at equilibrium than the Nash equilibrium result under the 
theoretical model. We classify these competing nodes into three categories 
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at equilibrium. When the bidding is bi = lUi at equilibrium, physically the 
competing node receives x'- = w“ and the allocated resource must be Xi = wi. 
It implies that the competing node does not encounter any network congestion. 
When the bidding is hi = (1 + at equilibrium, there are two cases to 
consider: (1) There is a bottleneck link (with available bandwidth Vj) between 
the competing node and the source node. Therefore, no matter how large the 
contribution value of the competing node or its bidding value, the competing 
node can only receive Vj amount of bandwidth resource. So we have bi = 
(1 + S)xi' = (1 + S)vi. (2) The competing node competes with other competing 
nodes for the resource at the source node. Therefore, the bottleneck is on the 
side of the source node. So we know bi = (1 + S)xi = (1 + S)xi. We define the 
above three categories of competing nodes at equilibrium to be in the sets 从， 
A//3, and respectively. 
L e m m a 4 .8 When the dynamic game reaches equilibrium, the following equal-
ity holds: 
rCi/Ci = Xj/Cj 
for all Afi,Afj G Af^. 
Proof: For competing nodes hfi G A/‘^ , the bottleneck is on the source node 
side. Following the equilibrium condition hi = (1 + S)xi and x'- = Xi for each 
competing node in the final "resource allocation level" in the RBM-IU 
mechanism should be {xi + bi)/Ci = (2 + S)xi/Ci for all competing node in 
Mi e A/；. • 
L e m m a 4.9 At any equilibrium of the dynamic game, the following inequality 
holds: 
Xi/Ci + ]^5xilCi > Xj/Cj 
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for all Mi e M^ and N) G Na U TV/?. 
Proof: Suppose we have competing node Mi G and J\fj E Ma U A//?. For 
some competing node A/}, the bottleneck is at the client side or intermediate 
links. The final "resource allocation level" in the RBM-IU mechanism, which 
is {xi + bi)ICi, must be higher than or equal to the "resource allocation level" 
of any N j , which is {x j + 6 j ) /C j . Therefore, we have 
[xi + hi)ICi > {x^ + 
From the equilibrium condition (1) bj = xj = x'- = wj for Afj G A f a , � 
bj = Xj = (1 + S)x'j = Vj for Afj G Afp and (3) k = (1 + = (1 + S)x\ for 
Mi G N-y. Therefore, we have (2 + 5)xilCi > 2xjlCj. I 
Theorem 4.10 The equilibrium solution of the dynamic game described above 
has the bandwidth allocation solution: 
Wi if Xi G Ma 
X. 二 c, if e 4 (4.2) 
^ ( w . - E - E 巧）if 工e 仏. 
。：i jeMc jeM^ 
jeM-i 
In addition, it becomes a Nash equilibrium solution when 5 approaches zero. 
Proof: Xi = Wi if Xi G Ma and xi = vi if xi G Mp follow directly from the 
equilibrium condition. Since all competing nodes in 為 are not saturated, they 
use up all the remaining resource Ws — HjeMc 切j — 巧.Follow Lemma 
4.8, the last equation holds. 
When S approaches zero, the strategy profile in equilibrium approaches: f 
Wi if Xi G Ma 
� = ' h i (4.3) 
- E ^  - E w) if e A. 
� j jeAfa jeMp 
jeAfi 
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By Lemma 4.9, Xi/Ci > Xj/Cj for all N] 6 Af’ and Mj G Ma^Mp. Physically, 
it implies all J\fi G M^ have the final resource "water level" higher than or 
equal to that of nodes in 从 U A//j. This strategy profile with the solution is 
a Nash equilibrium: (1) For competing nodes Afj G Ma U A//?, they gain the 
maximum resource so that no other better strategy for them to deviate. (2) 
For competing nodes N] G A/‘^ , they won't bid h'- < hi since xi always less than 
or equal to bi in RBM-IU. If they bid h'- > bi, consider the sub-game when 
W : = W5 — J2j£Afa lUj — J2jeMi3 ”i and the set of competing nodes is M ’ , From 
Theorem 4.4, we know the strategy hi is a Nash equilibrium which will not 
make one competing node better off after deviating from it. I 
Remark: Although the dynamic game equilibria are not strictly Nash equi-
libria, they are close to being Nash equilibria when 5 is small. The allocation 
results from these equilibria are the same as the equilibrium allocation when 
= 0. Therefore, we can regard the game as reaching Nash equilibrium if all 
the players play the Nash strategy profile. 
Chapter 5 
Generalized Mechanism and 
Game 
In last two chapters, we discussed our specific mechanism RBM-IU and its 
corresponding resource competition game. In this chapter, we extend our 
resource distribution mechanism with respect to incentive and utility. For 
incentive, we give a parametric manipulation to the contribution values Ci for 
the mechanism, such that we can control the degree of incentive provided by the 
mechanism. For utility, we explore heterogeneous nodes which have diversified 
utility functions (not necessarily Ui[xi^ hi) = log(a:i/6i + l ) in Chapter 3). After 
incorporating the generalized mechanisms, we further analyze the properties 
of the corresponding competition games. 
5.1 Generalized Mechanism with Incentive 
Recall the mechanism RBM-I in Equation (3.3). We bring the incentive by 
distributing the resource linearly proportional to each competing node's con-
tribution value Ci. In general, contribution values can be weighted by an 
33 
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exponent r > 0, and the resource distribution becomes: 
f q ( m - E f c ' x^ ] . 
H = mi 个 ， � �q k = l , … , N . (5.1) 
It is easy to observe that when r = 0, this mechanism is equivalent to the 
mechanism RBM-I. On the other hand, when r tends to infinity, this mecha-
nism becomes a strict priority service mechanism which serves the requests by 
their contribution values in descending order. Generally speaking, the larger 
value of r, the higher incentive this emchanism provides based on contribu-
tion values. Therefore, the parameter r provides some degree of freedom for 
the mechanism designer to balance the incentive and the fairness for the P2P 
system. 
Similarly, by generalizing Ci to the mechanism RBM-IU becomes: 
N f N ^ 
max V C[ log + 1 s.t. ^^ a:,- < € [0, V i. 
fet 乂 bi J i=i 
Because the new mechanism linearly weights each contribution by C[ , the 
implementation of the new mechanism can be easily extended by changing the 
original filling algorithm. In extending both the RBM-I and the RMB-IU, we 
make the filling rate of each competing node to be C[ instead of Ci. Visually, 
the resource distribution mechanism fills each competing node with a "bucket" 
with width 
Lastly, this extension maintains the properties of all previous theorems 
and the corresponding resource competition game. Some generalized version 
of theorems are as follows: 
Theorem 5.1 For any two competing nodes Afi,J\fj, the generalized RBM-UI 
assigns the bandwidth resources Xi and Xj such that: 
(5.2) 
bi Oj 
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Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1. I 
Theorem 5.2 The strategy profile b* = 二 f o r player M“ where i = 
1,…，yv, is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.5. • 
5.2 Generalized Mechanism with Utility 
In mechanism RBM-IU, we assumed a special form of utility function: U i { x i ) = 
log(|i + l ) . Although this type of utility is reasonable in some sense, we would 
like to consider the situation when competing nodes are heterogeneous in their 
utility functions. First, we explore the mechanism dealing with competing 
nodes which are heterogenous in their utility functions. Second, we would 
like to see whether the corresponding competition game has any equilibrium 
solution and what are the properties of such an equilibrium solution, if any. 
Similar to the mechanism RBM-U, our new mechanism tries to maximize 
the social utility. As in the context of the resource bidding mechanism, our 
utility functions should also depend on the bidding bi. Therefore, the new 
mechanism should solve the following distributed optimization problem: 
N N 
max U i � x “ bi) s.t. ^ Xi < W^ and Xi G [0，bi] V i. 
i=l i=l 
In the above mechanism, we assume the source node "knows" the utility type 
of each individual competing node and is able to solve the optimization locally. 
The utility function of each individual Ui(-) depends on Xi and bi. Let us 
consider Ui as a function of Xi/hi. We can regard Xi/bi as the percentage of 
satisfaction of each competing node with range [0,1 . 
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Theorem 5.3 There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the competition 
game induced by the following mechanism: 
N N 
max ^ s.t. ^ Xi < Ws and Xi G [0, bi] V i. 
i=i bi i=i 
where Ui{-) is any concave function for all i. 
— — — 
Proof: Consider any strategy profile b = {6“6—丄 where b—i is any fixed 
strategy profile (or bidding messages) of players other than Ni. We regard 
the resource allocation of Mi as a function of its bidding value, which is Xi{hi). 
A A A 
Noticing by the constraint xi < 6“ when Xi[hi) = bi for some bi, Xi may 
increase only by bidding bi > bi. Again, the mechanism solves the optimization 
problem by giving the resource to the competing node which has the largest 
marginal utility at that moment. Also the marginal utility dUi/dxi 二 
is decreasing when we increase bi. Hence, the function Xi{bi) can have the 
following three scinarios: (1) The marginal utility when Xi = 0 for any bi > 0 
(i.e. Ul{0)/bi) is less than that of any other player when the resource is used 
up. We have: Xi = 0\fbi > 0. (2) The marginal utility when xi = Ws for 
any bi > 0 (i.e. U'i{Ws/bi)/bi) is always the largest among all the players. We 
have: Xi = rnin{bi, Ws}\/bi > 0. (3) We increase k gradually from zero to 
infinity. Xi increases from zero when its marginal utility is among the largest 
and Xi{bi) = bi. After that, when we continue to increase bi, the marginal 
A 
utility decreases and Xi decreases until Xi = 0. When we have Xi(bi) = 0 for 
some bi > 0, we have Xi(bi) - 0\/bi > 6“ 
From the one-peak pattern of 0；<(6‘)，we know the upper-level contour set is 
convex and therefore, the function is quasi-concave in bi. By similar arguments 
in Theorem 4.2, we know there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium in this 
competition game. • 
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Theorem 5.4 Suppose b* and .iT* is a Nash equilibrium in Theorem 5.3. For 
any x*, Xj > 0, we have: 
u : 争 u ; , � =� 
P r o o f : Assume ( 薛 ） : U 時 > b* : 6* for some x ^ x * > 0. Therefore, 
U'i{^)/b* > which implies the marginal utility of player i is higher 
than that of player j . Therefore, the resource distribution mechanism can 
increase the aggregated utility by shifting some resource from player j to player 
i. So the mechanism does not solve the maximization on the aggregated utility. 
We have the contradiction here. • 
R e m a r k s : The implication of this theorem is that the bidding of each player in 
equilibrium should be proportional to their marginal utility (or shadow price) 
at that equilibrium point. 
Chapter 6 
Experiments 
In this chapter, we report experimental results to illustrate the performance 
and the incentive property of our resource distribution protocol. In particular, 
we will show that our protocol can properly adapt to dynamic join/leave of 
competing nodes, and to various conditions of network congestion. 
Experiment A (Incentive Resource Distribution): In this experiment, 
we consider a source node Afs with resource Ws 二 2 Mb/s. There are four 
competing nodes Afi to A/4. Their maximum download bandwidths are w = 
'2,1.5,1，0.5] (in Mb/s) . The arrival times of M , A/'2, A/'a and Af4 are t =20, 40, 
60 and 80 s, respectively. Unless stated otherwise, the propagation delay be-
tween a competing node and the source node Afs is one second and all compet-
ing nodes use S = 0.1 in Equation 4.1. We consider three scenarios, each using 
different contribution values for the four competing nodes. In E x p . A . l , we 
have C 二 [100，100,100,100]; in Exp . A .2 , we have C = [400,300,200,100]; 
in E x p . A . 3 , we have C = [400,100,200,300]. Figure 6.1 illustrates the in-
stantaneous bandwidth allocation for all the competing nodes for t G [0,100]. 
One can make the following observations: 
• Figure 6.1(a) shows that when all nodes have the same contribution 
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value, they will eventually get a fair share (i.e., even distribution) of the 
bandwidth resource. For example, for t G [20,40], gets all of Ws's 
resource of 2 Mb/s since it is the only competing node and wi = 2Mb/s. 
For t G [40,60], the resource is evenly shared by and M2 since they 
have the same contribution values. When all the four competing nodes 
are present [t € [80,100]), each node will get a resource amount x = 0.5 
Mb/s. 
• Figure 6.1(b) shows that the bandwidth resource assignment is propor-
tional to the contribution value of a competing node. When all four 
competing nodes are present (t G [80,100]), the resource allocation vec-
tor is X = [0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2] (Mb/s). Hence, RBM-IU provides service 
differentiation, such that nodes have incentive to share information and 
to provide services. 
• Figure 6.1(c) shows that the protocol will not waste any resource at the 
source node. Given C = [400,100,200,300], the resource distribution 
should be f = [0.8,0.2,0.4,0.6] (Mb/s). But since the maximum clown-
load bandwidth of AU is W4 = 0.5 Mb/s only, the remaining resource (0.1 
Mb/s) will be distributed proportionally to A/" i ,爲 and hfz' The final 
resource distribution is 茫 = [ 0 . 8 6 , 0 . 2 1 , 0 . 4 3 , 0 . 5 ] (Mb/s). 
In summary, these experiments show that the RBM-IU can provide incentive 
service differentiation and will efficiently utilize resources at the source node. 
Experiment B (Adaptivity to dynamic join/leave of competing nodes): 
In this experiment, we consider one source node Afs with resource Ws = 2 
—• 
Mb/s. There are four competing nodes to with contributions C = 
400,300,200,100] and maximum download bandwiclths w = [2,1.5,1,0.5] (in 
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Mb/s ) . There is a propagation delay of one second between a competing node 
and the source node. 
We consider two scenarios of arrival and departure patterns: Exp B . l : 
arrives and departs at i = 40 and t = 160, N2 arrives and departs at ：^  = 60 
and t = 100, A/3 arrives and departs at t = 80 and t = 120, and A/4 arrives 
and departs at i = 20 and t = 140. Exp B.2: Afi arrives and departs at 
^ = 20 and t = 100， A/2 arrives and departs at t = 80 and t = 120, Afs arrives 
and departs at i = 60 and t = 140, and hU arrives and departs at t = 40 and 
t = 160. Figure 6.2 illustrates the instantaneous bandwidth allocation for time 
t e [0,180:. 
One can make the following observations: 
• The protocol can assign the proper amount of resource to competing 
nodes without wastage. For example, for time t G [20,40], Figure 6.2(a) 
shows that J\U obtains 0.5 Mb/s (since this is its maximum download 
bandwidth). But for the same time period, Figure 6.2(b) shows that 
A i^ can get 2.0 Mb/s , its maximum download bandwidth and the full 
resource of the source node. 
• Both Figures 6.2(a) and (b) show that the protocol can fully utilize 
the source resources. For example, for period t G [40,120], the source 
node distributes the resource proportionally to the contribution values 
of the competing nodes. The assignment is independent of the number 
of competing nodes and their arrival patterns. 
• The protocol can reach the same equilibrium point, independent of the 
arrival and departure sequences of Exp B . l or Exp B.2. For example, 
consider the time period t G [80,100]. The resource distribution for 
both cases \s x = [0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2] (in Mb/s ) , which is also the Nash 
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equilibrium point. 
In summary, these experiments show that the protocol is adaptive to the 
arrival and departure sequence, and it provides service differentiation to dif-
ferent competing nodes having different contribution values. 
Experiment C (Adaptivity to network congestion): In this experiment, 
we consider one source node Ms with resource Ws = 2 Mb/s. At time 力= 0 , 
there are already four competing nodes Mi to in the system. These nodes 
have contribution values C = [400,300,200,100] and maximum download 
band widths of w = [2,1.5,1,0.5] (in Mb/s). There is a propagation delay of 
one second from each competing node to the source node. In this experiment, 
we consider the dynamic congestion situation. In particular, the congestion 
occurs along the communication path between Mi and the source node 
Congestion occurs twice, at time t = [30,40] and at time t = [50,60]. Dur-
ing the congestion, the available bandwidth along the communication path is 
reduced to 400 kb/s. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the instantaneous bandwidth allocation of all four 
competing nodes for time t G [0,100]. One can make the following observa-
tions: 
• At time ^ = 0, the system starts at Nash equilibrium with resource 
allocation of f = [0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2] (in Mb/s). 
• Between time t G [30,40] (or t = [50,60]), since there is network con-
gestion, the competing node Afi receives less transfer bandwidth from 
the source node. Other competing nodes N2 to A/4 can discover this idle 
bandwidth resource of 0.4 Mb/s via their bidding messages. The source 
node Ms will distribute this excessive bandwidth resource to the other 
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three competing nodes proportionally to their contribution values. New 
Nash equilibria are reached (t € [35 — 40] and ^ G [55 — 60]). 
• When the congestion disappears, the competing node Afi can gain back 
its proper resource amount of Xi = 0.8 Mb/s . Also, the new Nash 
equilibrium can be quickly reached and the final resource allocation is 
x = [0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2] Mb/s. 
In summary, this experiment shows that the protocol is adaptive to network 
congestion. During network congestion, the resource at the source node will 
not be wasted but rather distributed proportionally to other competing nodes. 
Experiment D (Relationship between the stepsize S and the equilib-
rium allocation): 
In this experiment, we consider one source node Ns with resource Ws = 2 
Mb/s . At time t = 0, there are already four competing nodes Afi to AU 
in the system. In particular, node Ni leaves the system at time 30. These 
nodes have contribution values C = [400,300,200,100] and maximum down-
load bandwiclths of w = [2,1.5,1,0.5] (in Mb/s) . There is a propagation delay 
of one second from each competing node to the source node. We consider four 
scenarios, each using different stepsize values S for the four competing nodes. 
In E x p . D . l , we have 5 = [0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01]; in E x p . D . 2 , we have 
S = [0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1]; in E x p . D .3 , we have S = [0.01,0.01’ 0.1，0.01]; in E x p . 
D . 4 , we have ^二 [0.01,0.1，0.01’ 0.1]. Figure 6.4 illustrates the instantaneous 
bandwidth allocation for all the competing nodes for t G [0,120 . 
One can make the following observations: 
• In Figure 6.4(a) and (b), all competing nodes have the same value of S 
(0.01 and 0.1 respectively). They show the same equilibrium allocation 
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for A/2,A/3 and A/4 after Ni leaves the system. The difference between 
these two scinarios is that from the time Mi leaves the system, it takes 
around 50 seconds to reach the new equilibrium in (a) but 5 seconds in 
(b). It is intuitive that larger 5 value makes faster convergence to the 
new equilibrium point. 
• Figure 6.4(c) shows the scinario when all competing nodes have 5 value 
0.01 except node J\fz has 知 = 0 . 1 . From t = 30, node A/^ increases its 
resource much faster than M2 and Ma�and even gain more resource than it 
gains in equilibrium from time 35 to 80. On the other hand, by comparing 
Figure 6.4(c) with (a), we find both the original equilibrium and the new 
equilibrium are different. In both equilibra, node A/3 gains less resource 
in (c) than in (a). Theoretically, when all competing nodes have the 
same 8 value, the actual equilibrium coincides with the theoretical Nash 
equilibrium. But larger S value makes less resource in actual equilibrium. 
• Figure 6.4(cl) shows the other way around when A/3 has less 8 value that 
other competing nodes. In this case, node A/3 reaches its new equilib-
rium slower, but gains more resource than that of the theoretical Nash 
equilibrium. 
In summary, these experiments show that the value of 8 affects both the 
equilibrium solution and the convergence rate for reaching new equilibra. In 
general, the larger value of 8, the faster convergence to the new equilibrium 
and the less resource gain the new equilibrium. 
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Figure 6.1: Instantaneous bandwidth allocations: (a) C = [100,100,100,100]; 
(b) C = [400,300,200,100]; (c) C = [400,100,200,300]. 
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Figure 6.2: Instantaneous bandwidth allocations for arrival and departure pat-
terns (a) Exp B. l ; (b) Exp B.2. 
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Figure 6.4: Instantaneous bandwidth allocations: (a) S = 
0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01]; (b) S = [0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1]; (c) 6 = [0.01,0.01’0.1,0.01]; 
(d) (？二 [0.01，0.1,0.01,0.1]. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we present a P2P network protocol that provides service dif-
ferentiation and gives incentive for nodes to share information and provide 
services. The solution consists of the resource allocation mechanism RBM-IU 
and the interaction protocol for competing nodes to reach equilibria of the 
competition game induced by RBM-IU. The solution is efficient: (1) RBM-IU 
can be implemented by a linear time algorithm, (2) the feedback based bid-
ding messages used by competing nodes are simple, and (3) RBM-IU achieves 
Pareto-optimal allocation results. The robustness of the solution is evidenced 
by the fact that all competing nodes can reach the equilibrium solutions of the 
competition game. The justification for the source node to use our protocol 
is its guarantee of Pareto optimality. On the other hand, competing nodes 
are motivated to use the protocol because it guarantees Nash equilibrium. We 
also show that the protocol is adaptive to various node arrival and departure 
events, and to different forms of network congestion. 
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